A Sample Feature From Aviation News

Russian revelations: the agenda

On June 9 a pair of Russian Tupolev Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers took off from their base at Engels-2 in central Russia on a routine patrol flight over the Arctic Ocean. Nothing so very extraordinary in that, you might think. But hidden behind this very ordinary activity was a decree signed on August 18, 2007, by then president Vladimir Putin for a resumption of flights across the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean and across the Arctic region on a routine basis for the first time in 15 years. The Editor has been to the frozen wastes, and to the Far Eastern zones of Russian Air Force operations to see what is going on.

Above: The colossal size of the Tupolev Tu-160, the world’s biggest combat aircraft, allows large fuel tanks to be incorporated within the blended fuselage and inner wing section giving the aircraft a maximum unrefuelled range of 7,500nm and endurance of 15hrs

IT HAS been apparent over the last few months that Russian air activity, along with test flights of ballistic missiles and expanded naval operations, has increased to a level unseen since the Cold War. So it was with no great surprise that the June 9 flight across the Arctic Ocean by two Bears was spotted and tracked by Nato assets. Speaking nonchalantly about the event, Lt Col Vladimir Drik said that ‘the aircraft will perform a variety of tasks, including midair refuelling from two Il-78 aerial tankers based at the Dyagilevo air base’. He emphasised that the aircraft would remain in international airspace and would not violate national borders.

That is not the point. The real issue has been expressed to us by Air Force commander Col Gen Alexander Zelin who confirmed that the number of strategic air patrols over the world’s oceans would increase progressively to 20-30 a month – in the near future. Although routine long-range patrols by the Russian Air Force ended in 1992 due to economic reasons, restoration of such activities was always on the cards and this is why there is a proportionate increase today.
Interceptions are not always over international waters. On February 9, 2008, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force scrambled 24 F-15J Eagles and an E-767 AWACS as a Tu-95MS violated national airspace with a fast 3min flyover of Sofugan in the Izu Islands. The aircraft diverted from a flight of four operating over the Pacific and the incident came close to a hostile response as two of three warnings prior to a shoot-out were given by the Japanese controllers. The Russians claim their aircraft were in international airspace at all times, but the radar records show different. This incident came just a week after another Tu-95MS twice flew at 2,000ft right over the USS Nimitz in the Pacific while a second aircraft circled 58 miles away. Four Boeing F/A-18 Hornets scrambled and tracked the Russian aircraft. The Nimitz received another visit on March 5, just off the coast of Korea, attracting not only a response from the carrier’s Hornets but from Korean Air Force F-16s.

Above: A single mid-air refuelling from the fuselage centreline UPAZ pod on an Ilyushin Il-78 tanker gives the Tu-95MS a range of 7,600nm. 56 years after its first flight the Bear is still a formidable cruise missile launcher and highly effective as a long-range reconnaissance and surveillance platform.

First base
One of the most important bases we visited in the Far East was Ukrainka, 15 miles from Belogorsk, and it was from here on May 13, 2008, that two Tu-95MS’ conducted a 20hr patrol across the Arctic, refuelling from an Il-78 before heading down into the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone, part of Norad’s North American defence screen and a vital frontier guard against intrusions. Canadian CF-18 Hornets were scrambled to intercept the intruders, which departed for the US Alaskan airspace region. Ukrainka is a large nuclear bomber base with long runways and about 40 revetments. Set up in 1955 it has always figured prominently in Soviet/Russian counterforce capabilities in the Far East region and has hosted M-4 Bison, Tu-22 and Tu-95 aircraft. For several years the base was in decline, now revitalised by a return to the logical use of bomber forces to counter naval threats from seas and oceans to the east. Readiness to deter probing flights from US, Japanese, even Chinese aircraft is a high priority and the status of the base has increased recently with the return of an airborne nuclear capability and the extension of storage, maintenance and personnel facilities. Road construction and new hangars for transport aircraft all indicate heightened activity and a new set of housing blocks has been constructed. The current unit operating from there is the 326th TBAP (heavy bomber aviation regiment) which controls Tu-95MS operations across the Pacific as well as co-ordinating two Tu-22 regiments nearby.

Alert status at the base is high, Russian commanders citing the build-up of US naval forces in the region around Japan and Korea as a prerequisite for 24hr readiness levels. It appears this renewed Cold War stance was reactivated in August 2007 when Putin ordered resumption of overflights. No one is saying exactly when the call came to shift status, but it was confirmed that it came from the Kremlin. Nothing happens without the Kremlin’s say-so. There is little sign of a war-footing, but there is a measurable increase in readiness and a sharper performance from crews now on rotation with a 30min ‘in-air’ standby. Superficially, this level is alarming because it is ostensibly, a strike force. Talking to senior personnel (no other contact was permitted!), there is a seemingly genuine suspicion of US intentions, just as there is from the Engels-2 base regarding Nato and the remorseless escalation in member states.

Common to both places, personnel at Ukrainka and Engels-2 cite the reliance on naval air power by US forces as reason enough for strategic anti-ship defence systems that transform long-range bombers into tactical strike assets. The Russians see long-range strike against carrier forces as a viable means of maintaining national security. The aircraft they have are well adapted to this task and the level of hardware upgrade and updated command control systems is sure proof that this doctrine is here to stay. Probing flights by Russian aircraft carry the dual role not only of presenting a political message but also flying, in simulation, missions they know they will be called upon to carry out if ever there was a hot war in the region, attack being the best form of defence. When engaged on the subject of demarcation lines, Russian air force officials are circumspect about the objectives behind Putin’s directive. There is no indication whatsoever that provocation is the aim but continuous probing is useful for both sides, as the Russians are keen to point out: ‘You get to see ours before we get to see yours.’ True!

Above: Introduced in the 1980s as a successor to the Tu-22 Blinder, the Tu-22M Backfire was a major step ahead of its predecessor, unhinging strategic arms limitation talks between the superpowers when analysts at first misinterpreted the type as a long-range strategic bomber. Losing reputation with age, the Tu-22M is destined for retirement as a new generation of manned bombers begins development.

A question of money
So where is the money to expand and extend military operations and increase procurement of new systems coming from? Unlike the financial situation a decade ago, the Russian economy is in great shape and there is money to spend of which an increasing proportion is for defence. The federal budget surplus for January-May this year stood at $53bn compared with $32.5bn in the same period last year. In that period this year the authorised federal budget stood at $156.1bn while expenditure was kept within $103bn. Under Putin’s guidance the economy has progressed so well that there is real money for big defence projects directed primarily to the navy and the air force. Procurement is a key to re-energising the defence infrastructure, with increased production of new aircraft and an accelerated replacement of old types. Strategic long-range aviation, once the cornerstone of air power projection, is to get a new injection of funds with production lines reopened on existing type.

Under Putin, the Russian leadership developed a passion for linking foreign policies to perceptions of strong military capabilities and after almost a decade of decline, by the early years of the new century defence spending had soared. Embracing global reach, rapid reaction capabilities and deterrence, the Air Force is strengthened through these increases, running at 20-35% year-on-year since 2002, spending increasing from $5bn in 2002 to $31bn in 2007. This unprecedented increase is linked to a desire to regain the respect of the world community, a position felt strongly in the Russian air force. Morale in the Air Force is higher than any current serving officer at either Ukrainka or Engels-2 can remember, enthusiasm for the New Russia at an all-time high, fuelling a commitment, lacking throughout much of the Cold War period but now re-energising Russia’s military forces. There is little interest in jingoism and apparently no interest in deliberately returning to the days of brutal stand-off where many aircraft were lost in hostile confrontations. Yet for all that, there is an immediacy to Russian preparations and re-armament, embracing not only modernisation of force structures and new equipment but on the willingness to act with resolve first, diplomacy second.

The obvious reasons for Russia’s sabre rattling are not always easy to find, although there are peripheral conditions readily apparent to anyone travelling to the border states of the old Soviet Union. Access to the Mediterranean is a bone of contention and has been since the southward expansion of the Muscovite Rus began several centuries ago. It is why Greece and Turkey were early converts to Nato; the choke point that is the Bosporus makes it so. Now, the Ukraine has served notice on Russia that the Black Sea fleet will not be welcome at Sevastapol beyond May 28, 2017, when the existing agreement expires. On May 20 the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushenko signed a decree ordering the cabinet to draft a law by July 20 terminating all international agreements relating to the presence of the Back Sea fleet in the Ukraine. This comes on the heels of a decision by the Kremlin not to pull back from the Black Sea but to retain a presence in that area as well as in the Mediterranean. But as always with Russia, there is a hidden protocol. Russia sees integration of air and naval assets as a valuable instrument in displaying its new political doctrine to neighbours and to the west alike, seeing fixed-wing carriers as key to implementing a more aggressive policy of flag-presence on the high seas. And these policies are causing an accelerated development of both air and naval capabilities with new equipment and new bases.

In a complete reversal of former decisions, and those announced in previous issues of Aviation News, we learn that Russian plans may include an increase in the number of naval vessels in the Black Sea from 35 to 100 ships and that it might increase personnel strength from 11,000 to 25,000. The presence of the carrier Kuznetsov in the Mediterranean on exercises far bigger than anything seen since the end of the Cold War – the first of the kind in that area – makes it a new theatre of Russian influence. Meanwhile, work goes on to create a new naval base at the eastern end of the Mediterranean on the coast of Syria. All of which is proving very popular back home, especially among the young, where more than two-thirds believe Sevastapol should be returned to Russia, citing grounds of security and historical possession as reasons to retake the city. The key here is that concerted efforts to integrate sea and air operations mean that naval activities are now inextricably linked to operations and activities of the Air Force.

In a major move to expand combined naval and air operations, Lt Gen Vladimir Shamanov has said that this year the summer exercises involving both sea and air forces from June 1 to December 1 will see ‘increased presence not only in the Atlantic but also in the Arctic and the Pacific’. Shamanov heads the defence ministry’s combat training directorate, a department that has been given additional funds and strong support from the political leadership. It is also apparent at Vladivostok that Arctic troops are conducting integrated joint force exercises on a more sustained basis. These involve aircraft operating far across the Arctic wastes in the general direction of the North Pole as well as with warm-water forces at sea and in the air stretching out across the Pacific Ocean. Integrated land, sea and air exercises are not new but the intensity with which they being conducted is a shift in gear to more complex and broadly based war-fighting strategies. Aircraft are playing a new and invigorated role in operations policing and probing far toward the North Pole, using the Arctic routes to head down into the Atlantic Ocean and along the US eastern seaboard, or down past Alaska and into the Pacific Ocean. Along with these exercises, Russia integrates ballistic missile flights and provides co-ordinated operations in two oceans simultaneously. Standard for Nato or US forces; novel for Russia.

Above: Japan is to Russia in the Far East as Greece and Turkey are to the Black Sea Fleet in southern Europe: a defensive bulwark against unimpeded access to open sea. Strategic imperatives commit US forces to ensuring Japan will never fall to either Russian or communist Chinese forces. This alone has shifted the US to consider a future nuclear-armed Japan as a deterrent to continental ambitions.

For the rest of this feature please see the August 2008 issue.