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A Sample Feature From Aviation News Killing the RadarsWritten by the late Bruce Robertson, this feature looks at the Allied effort to destroy or otherwise damage the German radar system along the northern coast of France. A chain of radars and observation posts from Holland to St Malo in France was established by the Luftwaffe from 1941 to give warning of the various offensive incursions by the RAF by day and bomber streams at night heading for Germany. Associated with these were direction centres to co-ordinate reporting with ground control stations in contact with day or night fighters and with anti-aircraft gun units, all of which came under unified Luftwaffe control and manned by Luftwaffe personnel. This narrative is concerned with the Normandy frontage.
Above: A surviving Wurzburg-Riese or Giant Wurzburg on display at the German museum at Gatow. Right: A PR vertical shot of the Arromanches radar station showing its proximity to the village of that name. As soon as a bridgehead was secured the fields behind the station were used as a form-up area for units arriving in dispersed landing craft. Below: An oblique shot of the radar station taken during a photo-reconnaissance sortie on January 23, 1943. Photo-interpreters have marked the Giant Wurzburg and Coast watcher radars as targets.
Fluko detachments In addition to the radar stations on the Normandy coast were a series of observation posts set around ten kilometres apart, but closer if headlands were concerned, to enable visual signalling to adjacent posts. For the Normandy coast these were regionally controlled by the Flugmelde Zentrale (Plotting Centre) situated some three miles inland near Caen. Altogether the Caen centre controlled some 68 individual Flugwachkommando (Fluko) which were observer post detachments. Those posts to be confronted by the Allies on D-Day were:
All except Nos 59 and 60, which were day only posts, were manned by five to six men under an Unteroffizier to maintain a 24hr watch, while day posts had four men usually under an Obergefreiter (Leading Aircraftman equivalent). Unlike the civilian status of the British Royal Observer Corps (ROC), whose seaborne members were to appear off the Normandy coast as advisors to merchant ship masters on aircraft recognition, the German observers were uniformed and armed. Being an adjunct to normal Luftwaffe requirements, the personnel came from so-called reserve units; those manning the posts above belonging to 6/16 Flugmelde-reservekompanie (Aircraft Reporting Company of the Reserve). Accommodation for post members varied from a hut to a commandeered seaside villa. Each post was equipped with a Zeiss Flak Fornrohr (a powerful telescope), field glasses and telephone. Aircraft recognition was not deemed of prime importance as with their British ROC counterpart. The incursions by Allied aircraft were reported by number, height and direction of flight. Heights were given in general terms as: Very low – under 100m, low – 100 to 1,500m, medium – 1,500 to 3,000m, high – above 5,000m and very high – at discretion. While this might appear amateurish, it should be appreciated that aircraft flying low gave no time for height plotting and since accurate judging was difficult to gauge with aircraft of varying sizes, this was best left to the radar plot reports. If action ensued in the vicinity of posts observers were expected to give a running commentary to their control centre. While coastal batteries were occasionally subject to attack by bombers and radar stations, with their conspicuous aerial arrays, a target for strafing attacks by fighters, the observer posts were left alone. At Nr 60 St Aubin a private with a personal interest in archaeology discovered during 1943 Celtic remains, Roman baths and villas in the vicinity of his post. He occupied his spare time excavating until January 1944 when a visiting officer told him to stop as his digging was not contributing to the defence of the Reich. Obsessed with his hobby he appealed to Professor Molius at the Reichs Kunst Schutz who persuaded Feldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, to sanction his work. He was still digging on June 5. Early next morning Allied artillery took a hand in excavations in his area.
Above: Layout of the Arromanches radar station site based on sketches made by RAF Medmenham for the guidance of pilots briefed to attack it. A – Coastwatcher radar, B – Giant Wurzburg, C – prepared sites possibly as decoys, D – group of three embanked control and accommodation huts for duty personnel (off-duty personnel were housed in the village), E – pole masts, F – Dug-outs. Roads and paths are shown by broken lines, cabling by dot and dash lines, while the crosses represent the barbed wire inner and outer defences of the station. The Flugmelde Zentrale at Caen, controlling the posts, became a hive of activity as air operations increased in tensity during the run up to D-Day. There the plotting table consisted of a map of the area marked over with the German fighter defence zone grid. Around the coastal fringe portrayed on the map was a red light bulb for each observer post, that lit up when a post reported sightings. In this way the input of verbal information was immediately located geographically by the controller. Being so near the coast the senior controller realised that in the event of Normandy being the target for the Allied invasion, his centre was liable to be overrun. As a precaution packing cases were held ready for a quick move, but in the event lack of transport thwarted a complete evacuation. There is no evidence that similar plans existed for the radar stations and observer posts. The probability is that they did not as such an arrangement would appear to support a defeatist attitude. For a while the German High Command accepted that landings would be made and counter forces were best kept inland to move against bridgeheads. Hitler himself was obsessed with the unrealistic view of fighting it out on the beaches.
Above: Hawker Typhoon Ib TP-Q of No 198 Sqn taxies out for a ‘Cab-rank’ sortie from a dusty airstrip in France. Station strafings It was the radar stations and coastal batteries that bore the brunt of the pre-invasion attacks. To maintain the Allied deception plan that the main thrust would be in the Pas de Calais area the whole radar chain from Belgium down to St Malo was put under attack. The radar chain, which included inland zones, consisted of 26 coastwatch stations, 24 aircraft reporting and day fighter control stations or centres, some as far inland as Paris, and 12 night-fighter control stations, all inland. They had been photographed vertically and obliquely, then charted by the Central Interpretation Unit, RAF Medmenham. The stations were classed as Type XII Rhubarb attack targets and each had a target number. Some of the photo cover dating back to 1942 was updated with later information from aerial reconnaissance and reports from the French Resistance. With the concentration of radars in the Pas de Calais area the plan was to give these heavier attacks than other areas to comply with the deception plan. But this had to be tempered by leaving at least two stations still operative to report the approach of the ‘Phantom Fleet’ on the night of June 5-6. This was to be simulated by ‘window’ dropped from Lancasters flying to a set pattern. Nevertheless, the attacks to knock out the radars in the vital Normandy area were heavy and it was essential that these attacks achieved their objective in completely silencing the stations. At the Arromanches radar station, perched on cliffs a little to the east of the village, personnel logged the first attack at 14.00hr on May 22 conducted by 20 to 25 Mustangs and Thunderbolts approaching from the north-west at about 2,000ft. They then turned south and when about four kilometres away dived out of the sun to attack with cannon fire and rockets. To the attacking pilots little damage appeared to have been done and they may well have thought that the site, with its radar in concrete emplacements, was a job for bombers rather than fighters. However, experience over the past two years had shown that bombers were not sufficiently accurate to hit radar emplacements and blast had little effect on the grid framework of the aerials. A cannon shell or bullet tearing through intricate electronic equipment could be more effective in putting a station out of action.
Above: Cannon-armed Typhoons, such as the Mk Ib shown, proved the most effective aircraft for attacks on radar stations. Later, post-invasion, Allied intelligence officers sifted through the remains of the Normandy coastal radars. They found it difficult to assess the sequence of damage after the air attacks, D-Day shelling, attempted destruction by station personnel before evacuating and subsequent souvenir hunting. Fortunately they already had, by D+2, a report on the effectiveness of the air attacks from captured personnel. Both the stations at Arroman-ches and Parcée were taken from the rear on D-Day. The majority of their personnel, alerted all night by the great air activity, drew back as soon as dawn revealed the Allied armada. However, one member from each of the two stations was captured, together with a member of a mobile radar repair team that had been busy in the area. The captured radar personnel, with local infantrymen, were marched down to the beaches by Pioneer Corps troops. There they were placed in LCIs (Landing-Craft Infantry) returning to England after disgorging their troops. On landing in Britain air intelligence officers separated the Luftwaffe personnel for de-briefing and it was from the detailed accounts that these prisoners gave that the effectiveness of the silencing of the Normandy radars was realised. For the rest of this article please see the June 2004 issue. |
