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Iraq’s vanishing Air Force

What happened to the Iraqi Air Force during Operation Iraqi Freedom? Why were no combats reported and what survives today? More importantly, when will a restructured and re-equipped Iraqi air arm be formed? Anthony Tucker-Jones reports on how the Iraqi Air Force cut a deal with Washington.

Above: Sand-blasted and long out of service, this Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle bomber became one of the many decoys parked on Iraqi airfields to lure Coalition aircraft away from more operational types.

American troops triumphantly burst into Saddam International Airport (SIA) and Rashid military air base, both just outside Baghdad, in early April 2003. Only at the former was there any real resistance and to the Americans amazement there was no sign of the once powerful Al Quwwat Al Jawwiya al Iraqiya or Iraqi Air Force (IrAF). While little was expected of the IrAF in 2003, no one thought it would vanish completely.
Evidence indicates that the IrAF was either bought off like the Republican Guard or simply threatened into submission. US military planners wanted to secure SIA and take out the main Iraqi fighter bases at al-Asad, al-Taqqadum and Rashid, so they cut a deal with some of the more moderate elements of the IrAF. It remains unclear what level of complicity IrAF Commander Lt Gen Hamid Raja Shalah al-Tikriti had with Washington, but the fact remains the Iraqis did not put up a single aircraft. Unlike the senior Republican Guard and intelligence officers who are believed to have betrayed Saddam Hussein, Gen Shalah was listed on America’s Iraqi Top 55 deck of cards as number 17.

Saddam Hussein declared in August 2002 ‘If they come, we are ready. We will fight them on the streets, from the rooftops, from house to house. We will never surrender.’ Interestingly, he said nothing about fighting them in the air. At the same time Gen Shalah had claimed categorically that, ‘Our air force’s fighters are ready to confront and defeat the aggressors if they dare to approach our territories.’ Iraqi MiG-29s shooting down Coalition unmanned aerial vehicles was one thing, taking on the latest American air superiority fighters was quite another.

The following month the Coalition made it very clear, when over 100 aircraft attacked Iraq’s H3 air base in September 2002, that if the IrAF resisted it would be destroyed. Officially, the raid was part of the enforcement of the southern no-fly zone, but in reality it was placing a calling card which the IrAF could not fail to miss. After that Washington secretly put out feelers to individual IrAF commanders advising them not to resist, and replies came back to the effect that they might indeed prefer the alternative. The senior IrAF leadership comprised Gen Hamid Rajah Shalah, IrAF Commander; Gen Saad Ahmad Naji, Assistant for Operations; Gen Ibrahim Ali Youssef, Commander of Aviation: Gen Sabah Mutlik, Commander of Training and Gen Hussein Zibin, Commander IrAF Intelligence (though in 2002 was believed to be the Iraqi Army Aviation Corps – (IrAAC) commander).

Above: Once the fastest aircraft in the IrAF, the highly-valued Soviet-supplied MiG-25R Foxbat B fleet was reduced to an unserviceable group of grounded airframes. This is No 351-05.

Above and below: Remains of a Tupolev Tu-22U Blinder crew trainer variant of the twin-jet bomber. Five are reported to have survived the 1991 war, but it’s unclear whether this wreck dates from that period.

Washington also had senior military Iraqi exiles it could draw on such as Gen Fawz al-Shammari, former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi 3rd Corps. Just before hostilities he stated, ‘We have good contact with the Iraqi armed forces, the tribes and even some officers in the Republican Guard. They put good hope on the support of the US.’ In late-November 2002 it became public knowledge that senior Iraqi security officials had approached Washington with a view to abandoning their leader. Elements in the IrAF knew they could not avoid the war altogether, but sought a way to safeguard themselves and their remaining airworthy aircraft. It appears the Americans agreed that if they did not fight, al-Asad about 170km north-west of Baghdad, home of the IrAF’s Fighter Command and the second largest base in Iraq, would be spared. Secretly, across Iraq the order went out not to resist.

Many intelligence analysts felt that the superior educated air force personnel had a better appreciation of the situation and were viewed as a threat by the very regime that they were supposed to defend. Saddam Hussein knew he faced betrayal. For example, former IrAF Gen Ali Hussein Habib was arrested just before the air attacks commenced on Baghdad. His headless body was found outside Abu Ghraib prison in a shallow grave on April 15, 2003. Habib had been involved with the Iraqi chemical weapons programme and had been prepared to be interviewed by UN inspectors without minders. It may have been that Saddam’s regime suspected he was already collaborating.

Six months after the attack on H3, on March 16, 2003, at an Iraqi council of war in Baghdad, 150 senior officers including IrAF Gen Kareem Saadoun dared not remind Saddam Hussein they simply could not win. In 1991 the IrAF’s pilot training was poor, as was the serviceability of its fighters and on top of this it was operating some 15 different types of fixed-wing aircraft. Twelve years on, the IrAF was not blind to the fact that these deficiencies had only got worse. The UN embargo ensured they received no vital spares, no new aircraft or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), though some spares for Iraqi MiG-23s, and MiG-25s, may have been sneaked in via Syria.

On January 14, 1991, Gen Wafic al-Samurrai, head of Iraq’s military intelligence, briefed Saddam, stating Iraq would suffer a swift defeat. In late-March 1991 when the fighting had finished al-Samurrai went before Saddam again to inform him they had suffered the biggest defeat in military history. One of al-Samurrai’s successors, former intelligence chief Farouk Hijazi, captured on April 24, 2003, had a similar tale to tell; Saddam would simply not accept that they could not successfully resist the technological array of weapons facing them.

IrAF inventory assessed

After years of military sanctions it was assessed by Western intelligence that the IrAF still had approximately 130 attack aircraft and 180 fighters, of which only 90-100 were deemed to be operational (the MiG fleet may have included 30 MiG-21PF/MFs, 30 MiG-23MLs, five MiG-25PDs and four MiG-29s at the end of 2002), enough to thwart any internal unrest but not to take on the might of the United States Air Force (USAF). According to Gen Saadoun, the order to safeguard their aircraft rather than fight was issued in late February 2003, when they began to disassemble and conceal them. The IrAF along with the IrAAC abandoned its air bases and civilian dispersal sites, which were well known to Coalition intelligence, and scattered across the width and breadth of the country. Just as in Operation Desert Storm the IrAF escaped north of Baghdad. This time, the IrAF knew better than to flee to Iran, because in 1991 this plan failed to safeguard precious airframes after Tehran refused to return over 100 front-line aircraft.

It is also alleged that the Iraqi Air Defence Command (IrADC), now only operating at 50% capacity, also received instructions not to use their radars. Turf squabbles, deliberate or otherwise, stymied the air defence of Baghdad. Some IrADC units were reminded that this was the responsibility of the Republican Guard and ordered not to activate their weapons. Nonetheless, Lt Gen Muzahim Sa’b Hassan al-Tikriti the IrADC commander was number 12 on the Americans’ wanted list. The IrAAC commander was notably not on the list.

According to some IrAF officers, once the fighting started, they received no further orders. Col Diar Abed at Rashid air base noted, ‘We had no orders. We just stayed in the bases and waited... Why don’t they give us orders. The leaders at the base didn’t know anything.’ Gen Saadoun, also at Rashid, recalls bitterly, ‘They just gave us Kalashnikovs [assault rifles], not even anti-aircraft weapons.’ Two weeks before Rashid fell its communications were cut. Somebody somewhere had betrayed them.

Burying modern combat aircraft in sand is not recommended, but that was one of the ploys used by the IrAF to conceal some of its front-line fleet. This MiG-29 at al-Taqqadum was uncovered and pulled from its tomb. A look into the cockpit revealed a worn interior with some parts and instruments removed. The aircraft on the left is numbered 29040.

Above and below: Burying modern combat aircraft in sand is not recommended, but that was one of the ploys used by the IrAF to conceal some of its front-line fleet. This MiG-29 at al-Taqqadum was uncovered and pulled from its tomb. A look into the cockpit revealed a worn interior with some parts and instruments removed. The aircraft above is numbered 29040.

For the rest of this article please see the April 2004 issue.